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CLOTILDE CALABI
1. Do you know her name?
Someone asks me her mother’s surname. I try to retrieve it from my memory
but fail to do so. I am, however, sure that in a few moments it will come back
to me. As we often say, ‘‘It’s on the tip of my tongue.’’ At some point, I shout:
‘‘Ancona!’’ The name is back, as if the obstacles blocking it had disappeared
completely, although I have done nothing to remove them. The word clicks!
We often have words on the tips of our tongues: the beginning of a poem,
the title of a novel, or simply a name. Users of sign language have signs on the
tips of their fingers (Thompson et al. 2005). To keep things simple, I shall
focus on tip-of-the-tongue phenomena (TOTs) concerning names. Let me
first say that TOTs are experiences that occur after the failed retrieval of a
particular name. The strange thing about these experiences is that when
someone asks you ‘‘Do you know X’s surname?’’ you respond ‘‘Yes.’’ And
if you are then asked what the name is, you are unable to answer right away,
although you are certain that retrieval is imminent. Hence, there is a failure,
albeit one accompanied by an anticipation of success. Finally, if retrieval does
occur and the word is recognized, the click experience you enjoy (i.e., the
recognition) is not simply fulfillment of the anticipation, but also an experi-
ence of familiarity—you recognize the name as a name with which you were
previously acquainted.
This article focuses on TOT experiences rather than the mechanisms
underpinning them. Theorists disagree about the nature of such experiences,
while acknowledging their intriguing and insidious character. For example,
Bennett Schwartz comments:
I suspect that the TOT is not a unitary experience, but a combination of
subcomponents, relating to positive and negative emotion, and feeling
of imminence, relief or strength. In some cases, these experiences may
grow, whereas in others, they may diminish. How these subcomponents
are formed and how they interact to create human experience and to
predict cognitive processes is a riddle, the answer to which is just be-
ginning to be unfolded (Schwartz 2002: 47).
And yet for some philosophers, the simpler the better. To wit, these philoso-
phers have tried to reduce TOT experiences to more common states, with
some considering these experiences to be beliefs about one’s state of know-
ledge, and still others considering them feelings about one’s state of know-
ledge. These two latter views are not mutually exclusive; indeed, one might
Analysis Vol 76 | Number 4 | October 2016 | pp. 409–418 doi:10.1093/analys/anw052
 The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust.
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
hold a mixed theory, according to which the TOT is a feeling that depends
constitutively on a belief. In what follows, I will first argue against the idea
that beliefs are a constitutive feature of TOTs and hence against both the
pure and the mixed belief theories; next, I will address the feeling theory.
Finally, I will defend a pluralist theory of TOT experiences.
2. TOTs are HOT
Rosenthal (2000) maps out the standard belief account of TOT experiences.
It should be remarked that Rosenthal does not provide a fully developed
account of TOT experiences. He considers them as a particular case of feel-
ings of knowledge and discusses them in the context of his higher order
thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, as a potential difficulty for it
(Rosenthal 2000). Thus, I will first say something about this theory and
then present the belief account that I extrapolate from what he says.
In brief, for Rosenthal a mental state M is conscious only if it is accompanied
by a simultaneous higher-order (i.e., meta-mental) state whose content is that
one is now in M. M can be a belief, a desire or an emotion, while the higher
order thought has as its object that state with its intentional content. For
example, if I consciously desire chocolate, I have a higher-order thought
which has as its object that I desire chocolate. Thus, having a conscious
desire for chocolate involves being simultaneously in two mental states: a
desire for chocolate and a HOT whose content is that I am now having such
a desire. Given the distinction mode/content, the mode of this thought is
assertion—I make a judgment about my first-order mental state. Rosenthal
further contends that HOT about M occurs simultaneously with M, without
intermediaries, such as sense data, other judgments, images or feelings. Thus,
for Rosenthal, if a state is conscious, its owner is non-inferentially conscious
of being in that state. It is important to note that the consciousness of the
state must be independent not of any inference, but independent of any in-
ference of which the individual is conscious. Suppose, for example, that you
tell me that I want some chocolate, and I trust you. I become aware of my
desire for chocolate because I take your word for it. In this case, my desire for
chocolate is not conscious because my belief that I have that desire depends
on your telling me that I have it—it is the result of an inference of which I am
conscious. Here is what Rosenthal says:
Not every way of being conscious even of our own states makes those
states conscious. I may be conscious of being in a state by applying a
theory to myself or because somebody whose judgment I trust tells me.
We can, however, readily, rule out such counterexamples by positing
that a HOT results in the target state’s being conscious only when the
HOT is not based on any conscious inference, that is, not based on any
inference of which one is conscious. This does not mean that a state’s
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being conscious hinges on a HOT’s having some particular etiology
[. . .]. It is only apparent aetiology that counts: if it subjectively seems
that we are conscious of a state only by inference, that state is not a
conscious state (Rosenthal 2000: 207).
Let’s turn to TOT experiences now. As I said, Rosenthal considers them as a
potential difficulty for his HOT theory of consciousness. This is why. A
fundamental aspect of mental states, and particularly of conscious states, is
their content, that is, the information they carry. TOTs are a problem be-
cause when we are in a state that we describe as having a name on the tip of
our tongue, we are not conscious of the content of our knowledge, namely
what the name is. Yet Rosenthal thinks that TOTs are also HOT and their
peculiarity is that, despite the fact that their content is one’s first-order know-
ledge, the content of that first-order knowledge is not part of their content.
This means that if I have a name on the tip of my tongue, I am conscious (i.e.,
I judge) that I know that name, but I am not conscious of what the name is.
Thus, I can answer ‘‘Yes!’’ to the question ‘‘Do you know X’s surname?’’
without being able to answer the question ‘‘Do you know X’s surname?’’
Here is one such case. At some point in the past, I learned Mark Twain’s real
name. You ask me what it is. I am conscious that I know the name, that is,
I judge that I know it. Since judgments are expressions of beliefs, I believe
that I know it. But I cannot tell you what it is, that is, I cannot tell you what
the content of my knowledge is. According to Rosenthal, this means that I am
in a belief state that carries information about the name without having
access to the information that the state carries:
When I have Mark Twain’s real name on the tip of my tongue, I must be
conscious of the particular state that carries that information. But I am
not conscious of that state in respect of the specific information the state
carries; rather, I am conscious of the state only as a state that carries
that information (Rosenthal 2000: 204).
Moreover, given the above characterization of HOT consciousness, if I am in
a TOT state, although I believe that I possess a piece of knowledge, it does
not subjectively seem to me that I believe by inference to possess it. Rosenthal
roughly defines TOTs as follows:
(R) X has a word on the tip of her tongue iff (a) X is non inferentially
conscious that X presently knows the word, but (b) X is not conscious of
what the word is.
Herein lies my preoccupation about (R). Consider the following, slightly
different version of my ‘‘Ancona’’ example. I immediately recall that the
initial letter is an A, and that the bearer of the name is Jewish. I ponder
the possibilities. Since she is Italian and Italian Jews often have the name
of a city, I compose a list of cities: ‘‘Asti, Ascoli, Arezzo? I know it!’’ In this
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case, I am aware of both a phonological and a semantic cue, and it appears to
me that I would not possess these bits of information, unless I knew the
name. In other words, it appears to me that I am making some kind of
inference, namely an inference to the best explanation as to why I have
that information. If this is the case, I do not have the name on the tip of
my tongue because according to (R) if X is inferentially conscious that X
knows the word, then X does not have the word on the tip of her tongue.
Thus, if my experience depends on the presence of conscious cues, there is no
TOT. Yet this is utterly implausible.1
One way to respond to my objection is by making a distinction between
cues to obtain conscious knowledge that one knows the name and cues for
obtaining conscious knowledge of what the name is. The idea is that if I have
a name on the tip of my tongue, and have phonological as well as semantic
conscious cues, these are cues for responding to the second question only,
that is, cues for obtaining conscious knowledge of what the name is; they are
not cues for responding to the first question (i.e., whether you know the
name). But suppose that in this particular case, I say: ‘‘The name starts
with ‘A’. I am sure I know it.’’ It may be that my belief that the name
starts with ‘A’ prompts my knowledge claim. At least in this one case, the
cue is a cue for answering the first but not the second question. Clearly, (R)
needs revision. By dropping the condition about unconscious inference, we
obtain the following:
(R*) X has a word on the tip of her tongue iff (a) X is conscious that X
presently knows the word, but (b) X is not conscious of what the word is.
Remember that the belief theory states that there is a constitutive relation
between the belief and the TOT experience. I have rejected the one based on
(R), but, as we shall now see, the new version based on (R*) is not commendable
either. Suppose that I am asked the name of a street. The question itself may
prompt a TOT experience and perhaps the belief that I know the name. But this
means that the TOT can occur prior to the belief since it can in fact cause it.2
A different case is as follows. I hear the Xhosa-language word for the
knocking beetle when I hear Miriam Makeba sing the click song. I try to
say it, I have it on the tip of my tongue, but I do not succeed in saying it
correctly because the pronunciation is too difficult for me. So, I cannot hon-
estly say that I know the word. I do not believe I know the word. Yet I hear
someone say Qongqothwane, and it clicks. I realize that this is the word for
which I was searching. Thus, I believed that I did not know the word because
I underestimated my capacity for recognition. And yet I had the word on the
tip of my tongue: when I heard it pronounced, it clicked.
1 Rosenthal (2000) also admits unconscious inferences for TOTs, that is, inferences based on
unconscious cues. In my example, however, cues are conscious.
2 For this objection, see Dokic (2012: 305).
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Let me take stock of my argument thus far. I argued that there is no con-
stitutive relation between the second order belief and the TOT experience. For
one thing, it is possible that the subject did not acquire the belief that she
knows the name prior to the question and she has the TOT experience just
because she was asked the question. In this case, the TOT experience prompts
the belief that she knows the answer. The other case shows that it is possible
that the subject believes that she does NOT know the word, and yet still has
the TOT experience. Either way, TOTs do not depend constitutively upon
beliefs. I suggested at the beginning that belief theory and feeling theory are
not necessarily in competition with one another—one might hold that the TOT
qua feeling of knowledge, constitutively depends on a belief. But having argued
that the TOT does not constitutively depend upon a belief, neither the pure
belief theory nor the mixed theory is a viable option. Having rejected both, the
pure feeling theory is the second best option. According to it, the subject feels
that she knows the answer to the first question, although this feeling does not
depend on the belief that she knows the answer. Thus, for example, I feel that I
know the name of the street as soon as I hear the question.
3. James vindicated?
The main motivation for the pure feeling theory is phenomenology. There is
something it is like to have a name on the tip of one’s tongue, which I do not
confuse with any other experience: ‘‘if the word is on the tip of the tongue, it
feels like we can taste the word, sense it with our tongues, but just cannot get
our tongue completely around it’’ (Schwartz 2002: 50). James originally
advocated the feeling theory and recent versions of it appear in studies by
Koriat (2000), Koriat and Lieblich (1974), Mangan (2000), Schwartz (2002),
and Dokic (2012). For James, TOTs are the feeling of a lexical gap that ought
to be filled and whose filling is imminent. He says that, on the one hand,
TOTs have a phenomenology that makes them unlike other states, and, on
the other, each TOT is different from any other TOT:
Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness
is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is
intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a
given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our close-
ness and then letting it sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong
names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so
as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould. And the gap of one
word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content, as both
might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps (James 1890/1950:
251–252).
One could object that the expression ‘‘feeling’’ is an umbrella term for many
different things: there are feelings of pleasure/pain, feelings of heat/cold,
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feelings of easiness/uneasiness, familiarity/strangeness as well as affective
feelings. We could perhaps also add to the list another, indeed special type
called a ‘‘feeling of knowledge of words.’’ As far as the objection goes, we
would need to have a substantial enough theory of feelings to explain what
feelings of knowledge are and, in particular, the feelings about one’s know-
ledge of a name. Dokic acknowledges that ‘‘in advance absence of a substan-
tial theory of feeling’’ it is hard to classify certain feelings as ‘‘noetic feelings’’,
but according to him there are feelings that are clearly noetic, and TOTs are
among them (Dokic 2012: 303). He calls these feelings ‘‘seeds of knowledge’’
and suggests that they are ‘‘diffused affective states registering internal
physiological conditions and events. Unlike bodily sensations, though,
noetic feelings need not have precise locations in external bodily parts. At
a phenomenological level, they often have a spreading, blurred quality.’’3
And yet, despite the attractiveness of the feeling theory, we should consider
it with some caution. We already know that sometimes a TOT occurs in the
presence of conscious phonological information and that the phenomenology
of TOTs is such that each TOT is different from any other one. Having the
name ‘‘Ancona’’ on the tip of my tongue is unlike having the name ‘‘Treves’’
(another Jewish Italian surname) there. In what sense are these two feelings
different? The lingering preoccupation is that these feelings, which have ‘‘a
spreading, blurred quality,’’ are not fine-grained enough to capture and re-
flect the differences between the two experiences. There remains, however, a
different hypothesis about the nature of the TOT experience, which has not
been yet considered in the literature: in such cases, the TOT experience is the
perception of a word stored in memory.4 This hypothesis explains the differ-
ence between having ‘‘Ancona’’ as opposed to ‘‘Treves’’ on the tip of one’s
tongue.
4. The perception theory
The perception hypothesis rests on analogies between TOT states and per-
ceptual states, particularly, visual states.
(1) When I look at an object, even very limited visual information allows
me to become visually aware of the object itself. In a TOT experience,
information may be about the first letter of the target word, its gender
(in a language whose words are assigned a gender), the number of
3 Dokic (2012: 307).
4 As I described in the ‘‘Ancona’’ case, I vocalize the letter ‘‘A’’. Hence I perceive it.
Of course, in other cases someone may be aware of the initial letter of a name by
means of a thought (e.g. as the first letter of the alphabet). If one refers to it by means
of a description, one’s TOT experience would be even more inferential than Rosenthal is
willing to accept.
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syllables, or the syllabic stress. According to this hypothesis, phono-
logical information allows me to become aware of the word itself.
(2) Visual information about an F grounds the perceptual judgment that
there is an F with which I am acquainted even I do not have full access
to it and—at least in some cases—the judgment that its recognition is
imminent. Similarly, in a TOT experience, phonological information
supports both the claim that I am acquainted with the name itself (and
hence the perceptual judgment that there is a word with such and such
features that I know), without having full access to it, and the claim
that its recognition is imminent.
(3) The standard view on perception says that perceptual experience is
truth-tracking—that is, it allows us to keep track of external objects.
By virtue of its truth-tracking function, perceptual experience is the
main source of empirical knowledge. The psychological literature gen-
erally supports the idea that TOT phenomenology correlates with
phonological and/or semantic representations of words. In the hypoth-
esis under consideration, TOT states are also truth tracking, in that
they allow us to keep track of words stored in our memory.
(4) When there is representation, misrepresentation is also possible. In the
case of perceptual experiences, failure amounts to illusion and hallu-
cination. Misrepresentation is also possible for TOTs. Veridical TOTs
are experiences that represent a word stored in memory. Illusory TOTs
are experiences whereby it is as if the target word were there, despite
the fact that this word is unavailable, has been forgotten or was never
acquired (Schwartz 2002: 112). In this case, TOTs are sensuous ima-
ginings (of parts of words).
The Perception Theory has straightforward advantages over its competi-
tors. Unlike the Belief Theory in any of its versions, it explains the Miriam
Makeba case; unlike the Feeling Theory, it explains why having one word on
the tip of one’s tongue is unlike having another word. Yet, even this theory is
not sufficient to account for all TOT experiences, because it does not explain
those in which the TOT experience is the result of a conscious inference. The
reason is that, as most theorists about perception nowadays acknowledge,
perceptual experiences are not the result of a conscious inference. For TOTs
which are the result of a conscious inference, the theory based on R* offers
the best explanation. Yet, this is not the end of the discussion yet, because
even with this restriction, the hypothesis that in the presence of phonological
cues TOT experiences are perceptions of words raises the following objec-
tion: at least in the normal cases, a word must be uttered in order to be
perceived, but obviously tip-of-the-tongue experiences are not caused by
the utterance of the word. My answer to this objection is that for words
stored in our memory conscious phonological cues suffice to perceive them,
as much as sparse visual cues suffice to see objects. Of course, in the absence
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of phonological or semantic cues, there is no reason to reject the feeling
hypothesis.
To put it vividly, I am against the idea that one size fits all. Ultimately,
I think that a pluralist theory, according to which TOT experiences are per-
ceptions, beliefs or feelings of knowing, offers the best option. Of course,
feelings, beliefs and perceptions are different states, and one might wonder
why should we give them the same label. The answer is because of their
phenomenology.5 Take the distinction between emotions and quasi-emo-
tions. Theorists who make this distinction, while acknowledging that emo-
tions and quasi-emotions are different states, say that they have a similar
phenomenology (Walton 1978). My hypothesis is that this is consistent with
TOTs—different states but similar phenomenology. There is a common felt
quality to any state in which one accesses some lexical information incom-
pletely. Going back to James’ ‘‘gap’’ metaphor, the picture provided by it is
incomplete at best. However, he was at least right in saying that each TOT is
a unique experience.
5. A coda on cognitive phenomenology
My conclusion impinges upon the current debate in cognitive phenomen-
ology in the following way. Cognitive phenomenologists contend that
thoughts, such as having a belief or understanding a joke, have a phenom-
enology—there is something it is like to have conscious thoughts of the sort
mentioned above. Pure cognitive phenomenologists further claim that this
something is non sensuous, that is, that phenomenology of thought is
unlike phenomenology of perceptual experience. Some theorists extend this
claim to TOTs and contend that TOTs have a proprietary phenomenology
which is also non-sensuous.6 If I am correct, there is no reason to consider
TOTs as sui generis experiences, or to exclude the possibility of their having a
sensuous phenomenology. At this point, one might be tempted to argue that
TOTs do not enjoy a proprietary phenomenology, contrary to the claim of
pure cognitive phenomenologists. But drawing this conclusion would be
taking too much of a leap. Pure cognitive phenomenologists generally
focus on simple states like beliefs, and typically argue that these states have
a sui generis phenomenology. Then they extend this claim also to other states
such as TOTs.7 However, from the fact that TOTs are not sui generis
5 This does not oblige me to say that beliefs have a proprietary phenomenology. I am simply
saying that beliefs may be associated to some kind of phenomenology (more on this in
§ 5).
6 By ‘‘proprietary’’ I mean sui generis. On this see Pitt (2004).
7 Note also that cognitive phenomenology theorists generally overlook the question what
kind of states TOTs are. For example, Bayne and Montague (2011) assert that ‘‘we need
to address the question as to whether tip-of-the-tongue experiences [. . .] are states with a
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experiences it does not immediately follow that TOTs do not have a propri-
etary phenomenology. Suppose that a particular case of TOT is a combin-
ation of perception and belief. Many mental states that are a combination of
other states are such that their phenomenology is a byproduct of the whole.
Take fear—it is a combination of bodily changes, beliefs, desires, etc. Qua
hole, fear has a proprietary phenomenology (or so many theorists say).8 The
same could hold true for TOTs. But we can only argue for this if we take into
account the relation between a state’s nature and its phenomenology. The
current debate on cognitive phenomenology is not particularly interested in
the relation between the nature of a cognitive state and the phenomenal
properties of our mental life. Albeit there are some notable exceptions (e.g.
Carruthers and Veillet 2011) theorists generally either accept or reject the
claim that cognitive states have a proprietary phenomenology and they do
not address the issue as to what the relation is between the nature of a
cognitive state and its phenomenology. To address this problem also lies
beyond the scope of the present paper.9
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Save the children!
ART URS LOGINS
In a recent publication Travis Timmerman has claimed that sometimes it is
morally permissible to not prevent something bad from happening, even if it
is in one’s power to do so without sacrificing anything nearly as important.1
To defend his point, he has proposed a thought experiment and based his
claims on putative common-sense morality intuitions. To aid in the subse-
quent discussion, Timmerman’s case is reproduced as follows.
Drowning Children: Unlucky Lisa gets a call from her 24-h bank telling
her that hackers have accessed her account and are taking $200 out of it
every 5 min until Lisa shows up in person to put a hold on her account.
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1 He also argues that the claim (c), ‘[i]f it is in your power to prevent something bad from
happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so’,
defended by Singer’s Drowning Child thought experiment (Singer 1972: 231) is not posi-
tively supported by our intuitions. According to Timmerman, Drowning Child is irrelevant
to the truth of (c). I will focus only on Timmerman’s positive argument; namely, the claim
that common intuitions regarding his own thought experiment support the negation of (c).
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